This paper first examines various definitions of Kornai's soft budget constraint (SBC) and the difficulties involved in interpreting data on losses, subsidies and financing, and then considers selective evidence from transition economies. Stocks of overdue trade credit are no larger than in Western economies and firms in transition economies (TEs) typically impose hard budget constraints on each other. Banks have not been a systematic source of SBCs as often as is sometimes argued on the basis of data on classified loans; in 1992 Hungarian banks were imposing hard budget constraints on firms at the same time that they were classifying large volumes of their loans as bad. Tax arrears have emerged as a major source, and in the rapidly reforming TEs, the major source, of SBC's.
Introduction
The notion of the soft budget constraint (SBC), first introduced by János Kornai, is often used in analyses of the enterprise sector, originally in socialist economies, but now in transition and market economies. In practice, a number of different definitions of the SBC have been used in the literature, and views on whether firms in transition economies (TEs) have SBCs are similarly diverse. The purpose of this paper is to examine the various definitions of the SBC that are in use, to consider some of the conceptual and measurement problems faced in identifying SBCs, and to look at some of the available empirical evidence from TEs.
Section 2 considers some of the competing definitions of the SBC from the literature. The definition selected for the empirical portion of the paper follows from Kornai's paternalism model, i.e. a weak or paternalistic state will rescue a loss-making firm with subsidies or financing rather than allow it to close. Section 3 discusses some of the pitfalls in identifying losses, subsidies, and financing, and the limits to the inferences that can be drawn on the basis of observed profit/loss and balance sheet data. In particular, we argue that one cannot conclude firms have SBCs simply because they continue to make losses or because they have large stocks of overdue debts. Firms can be loss-making, or have large debts in arrears, and still have hard budget constraints as long as neither their creditors nor the state are rescuing the firm with net injections of cash or subsidies.
The remainder of the paper discusses empirical evidence regarding SBCs in TEs. Section 4 suggests that overdue trade credit, so-called 'inter-enterprise arrears', have not often been a source of SBCs, and when they have, it has been governments rather than the firms that have been responsible for the softness. Section 5 looks at the banking sector as a source of SBCs, for which the evidence is particularly unclear because of the problems in interpreting the increases in classified loans observed in TEs. The experience of the Hungarian bad debt crisis in 1992 is used as an example of how loans classified by banks as bad can be increasing at the same time that banks are trying to reduce their exposure to their problem clients. Section 6 suggests that tax arrears have emerged as a major, and in the rapidly reforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the major source of SBCs in TEs. Section 7 concludes.
The 'Soft Budget Constraint'
The definition of the SBC that is used most often by Kornai is a subsidy paid, typically by the state, to loss-making firms to guarantee their survival. ' If an enterprise found itself in financial trouble, the state bailed it out unconditionally. ... The state ... guaranteed the survival of chronic loss-making enterprises'. 1 The subsidy is paid ex post, after the state observes the firm's losses, without expectation of future repayment, and can take a variety of forms, e.g. a direct budgetary subsidy, an injection of credit from the state or another institution, a reduction in tax rates. Kornai introduced the SBC as part of his explanation of chronic shortage in socialist economies (Kornai, 1980) but since then the concept has taken on a life of its own. It is no longer linked primarily to the shortage phenomenon, and it appears regularly in the analysis of not only the socialist period but also of the transition period and is sometimes applied to developed market economies.
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In Kornai's analysis, the cause of the SBC is 'paternalism' by the state. 3 The state will rescue a failing firm because it is unwilling to accept the social consequences (e.g. unemployment) of its closure. The paternalism notion is more fundamental than the SBC concept itself and not only because in Kornai's model the SBC follows from paternalism. The SBC was introduced by Kornai (1980) to explain shortage in socialist economies with price mechanisms, e.g. the market socialist system introduced in Hungary in 1968. The SBC concept is not easily applied to the classical centrally planned economy (CPE), in which money is passive and plays the role of a monitoring device helping in the implementation of a Plan that specifies quantities.
Paternalism still existed in CPEs, however, and indeed there was a quantity-planning counterpart to SBC, namely ex post adjustment of enterprises' output targets and input deliveries to ensure that the enterprise 'fulfilled' the Plan. 4 This interpretation of the SBC phenomenon as an ex post bailout of loss-makers resulting from paternalistic preferences of the state has been explored in a number of papers. Quandt (1988, 1990 ) develop a family of models of the SBC in which the size of the subsidy received by a loss-making firm is determined in part by resources devoted by the firm to lobbying. They use the models to demonstrate how the presence of SBCs can increase factor demand and, hence, contribute to shortage in socialist economies. Hillman et al. (1987) also explore the consequences of government bailouts on factor demand. In their model, the firm faces an uncertain output price; a low price triggers a government bailout because otherwise the firm would have to reduce employment, and unemployment is politically costly.
Although the authors do not use the term, this is a SBC model. Gomulka (1985) introduced the concept of 'budget flexibility' and argued that, for SBCs to generate chronic shortage, budgets must not only be soft, but also be more flexible than prices, since sufficient increases in prices can eliminate excess demand and, hence, shortage. 5 The consequence of SBCs which Gomulka stresses and which Kornai also emphasizes (e.g. Kornai, 1993, p.316 ) is inefficiency of firms. Schaffer (1989) presents a game-theoretic model in which the SBC results from the inability of a paternalistic state to commit credibly not to rescue a firm that fails; the addition of imperfect information on the part of the firm about whether the state is 'weak'
(paternalistic) or 'tough' enables the state to build a reputation for toughness and impose hard budget constraints on firms. In their theory of privatization, Boycko et al. (1996) model politicians as using subsidies to induce firms to maintain higher levels of employment. Since the subsidies follow from what could be called the 'paternalistic' preferences of politicians, it is reasonable to assert, as the authors themselves do, that these subsidies provide firms with SBCs. We note, however, that this is a broadening of the SBC notion to cover employmentsupporting subsidies in general and not just subsidies to failing firms.
Other uses of the SBC concept appear in the economics literature and differ substantially from the above definition. These definitions are not necessarily 'wrong', and the phenomena that are being modeled are far from unimportant. It is essential, however, to draw attention to these differences, and to clarify which definition we will be using when analysing the empirical evidence on SBCs. One such extension is offered by Stiglitz, who suggests that SBCs arise not only when institutions 'believe that any losses they will incur will be made good by the government' but also when institutions 'have an incentive to make large gambles' (Stiglitz, 1990, p.184) . The first case is consistent with the definition of the SBC as ex post bailouts of loss-makers, but the second is quite different. The incentive of financial institutions to gamble refers here to the US experience with savings and loans institutions, in which insolvent banks tried to gamble their way out of insolvency by making high-risk loans. In the gambling bank model, an insolvent bank may be willing to invest in a risky project with an expected payoff that is low or even negative, because if the gamble pays off, the bank will become solvent whereas, if the gamble does not pay off, the bank will become 'more insolvent', i.e. no worse off than it was before it made the risky loan. This usage extends the SBC concept to include the situation in which an insolvent bank may be willing to invest in a project that is expected ex ante to be loss-making, albeit not with certainty.
Another extension of the SBC concept was introduced by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) , and subsequently developed by Qian (1994) , Berglöf and Roland (1997) , Bai and Wang (1997) , and others. In these models the SBC results from adverse selection. For example, a bank or some other creditor will in the first period fund a project that the bank does not realise will be unprofitable, e.g. a firm that will make losses. Following the first-period financing, the bank learns that it has financed a bad project and that it will fail to recoup its entire investment. The prospects for the project in the second period are sufficiently good, however, for the bank to refinance the project, because the first-period financing is now a sunk cost and the return to the bank after refinancing the second period of the project is greater than if the bank terminates the project after the first period. This is interpreted to be an example of the SBC since in the second period the bank is refinancing a project it at that point knows to have been bad.
Both the gambling bank model and the adverse selection models are capturing important economic phenomena. They are, however, very different from the models of ex post bailouts of loss-makers due to paternalism as developed by Kornai and others, in which the state or some other agent injects money into a loss-making firm without any expectation of repayment and simply because it suits the state's preferences to prevent the firm from closing. In both the gambling bank model and the adverse selection models, the financing decision is profitmaximizing for the creditor. In the former, the bank can return itself to solvency only by taking on projects that have some small probability of generating a very high payoff, even if ex ante the expected payoff is negative. In the latter, prior to first period, the project was not known to be bad and, prior to the second period, the project is actually good.
Perhaps the easiest way to see the differences between these models and the ex post bailout models of Kornai and others is to consider what would happen if, ex ante, the information that the project or firm was going to be loss-making with certainty was revealed to the creditor. In both the gambling bank model and the adverse selection models, if a creditor learns ex ante that the firm is definitely a 'bad' firm, it will refuse to finance it since to do so would be throwing money away. This is in sharp contrast to a model of ex post bailouts due to paternalism because in such a model the likelihood of obtaining financing is unaffected by ex ante revelation to the creditors that the project or firm is expected to be loss-making. If the firm is loss-making ex post, it is subsidized as a result of its situation and, consequently, the firm has a SBC.
The ex post bailout definition of the SBC appears the more compatible with the use of that term in policy-related discussions. Policy-makers are often encouraged to 'harden the budget constraints' of chronic loss-making firms by letting them close down, refusing them subsidies, and cutting them off from soft financing. For the remainder of this paper, we will use the definition of the SBC as ex post bailouts of loss-making firms resulting from paternalistic preferences. Firms that are known to be performing poorly will be rescued by the state or some other agent by granting subsidies or extending credits. Poor performance or losses result in, or make more likely, subsidies and financing.
Measurement
The definition of the SBC we are using implies that we should be looking for evidence that loss-making firms are receiving subsidies or financing. Interpreting the available data on profit, subsidies and financing is not, however, straightforward. Profit is measured only imperfectly, it can be defined in a variety of ways, and there are limitations to the inferences that can be drawn on the basis of observed profit/loss and balance sheet data.
Probably the most important technical problem with the profit/loss data reported by TE firms is that profits and losses are calculated using historical cost accounting. 6 Inflation imparts an upward bias to profits thus calculated, because the increase in the price level between the time inputs are purchased and the time that the output embodying these inputs is sold, causes the accounted costs of production to be undervalued relative to actual sales revenue. 7 This means, for example, that part of the decline in profitability observed in TEs following stabilization is illusory, since it reflects a reduction in the size of the inflation bias rather than a genuine deterioration in enterprise finances.
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A more difficult set of problems concerns the inferences that can be drawn from the observation that firms are making losses. The paternalism model predicts that firms that make losses will be rescued, but there are other possible reasons, compatible with the existence of hard budget constraints, for loss-making firms to receive subsidies or financing.
First, product-specific subsidies are often the result of price controls. When the price of a good is held artificially low relative to the cost of its inputs, firms will typically make a presubsidy loss but an after-subsidy profit on sales of the good; an example would be passenger rail transport in both TEs and developed market economies. We cannot readily separate subsidies to firms that are essentially parametric and part of the price system from subsidies that soften their budget constraints and bail them out. 9 Second, even when losses reflect genuine distress on the part of a firm, it may still be rational for a non-paternalistic creditor or government to rescue it with new financing or subsidies. The firm may currently be making losses but expected to make large profits in the future. Alternatively, the firm may be economically viable but loss-making because it has a large debt burden. The return to creditors may be greater if they provide the firm with further financing to keep it operating rather than withhold financing and see it fail. Similar reasoning would apply to a government rescue.
The choice of definition of profit can sometimes be helpful in distinguishing between some of these cases. We focus here on two standard definitions, earnings before interest, profit tax, depreciation, and extraordinary/exceptional charges (EBITD), and gross profit, i.e. earnings after all these items except profit tax. EBITD, or operating profit, is a measure of the income generated by the firm that is available to pay obligations to creditors, the tax authorities, and owners, and is independent of the capital structure of the firm. Negative EBITD is an indicator of economic distress, in the sense that the firm is unable to cover the basic costs associated with its activity, i.e. labour and materials costs and associated taxes such as payroll taxes and VAT. Losses or negative profits, on the other hand, may indicate either economic distress or financial distress.
The SBC, as discussed above, is about rescuing firms in financial distress. The source of the firm's losses do not matter in the paternalism model; it needs to be rescued whether or not it is economically unviable. If we observe, however, that the firm is both financially distressed (large losses) and economically distressed (negative EBITD), then we can rule out the specific alternative explanation that a non-paternalistic creditor is rescuing an economically viable but overindebted firm because the economic return is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, other explanations besides the SBC may explain observing financing or subsidies going to a negative EBITD firm, notably the expectation of future profits.
We also cannot immediately infer from observing loss-making by firms, even persistent lossmaking over several years, that they have SBCs. Profit, as in most Western countries, is measured on an accruals, not a cash, basis. This means, first of all, that even if a firm is both making losses and has negative EBITD we cannot automatically conclude that it is receiving additional external financing. Neither profit nor EBITD capture the cash flow generated by running down inventories, receivables or cash deposits. Second, interest costs and penalties are accrued costs, not cash costs. The implications of accruals accounting of interest costs can be demonstrated through a hypothetical example. Consider a firm with a large bank debt that it is not servicing, but suppose it is covering all its operating costs, i.e. EBITD is positive. The firm will be reporting large losses resulting from the large accrued interest costs, and this situation can persist as long as the debt remains on the books. Nevertheless, it is perfectly possible that neither the bank nor any other creditor is injecting any new cash into the firm, and that the firm is surviving solely through the income it is generating through sales. In such a case, the firm has a hard budget constraint despite the fact that it is making persistent losses and that it is becoming increasingly indebted to the bank. Only if the firm's losses cause it to receive a net cash injection from the bank or another creditor would it have a SBC.
A last problem relates to the limited inferences we can draw from the existence of overdue debts on firms' balance sheets. It has been observed that firms in TEs often have large stocks of overdue debts to other firms, to banks, and to government in the form of tax arrears. The mere existence of stocks of overdue debt is not, however, conclusive evidence of either financial distress or SBCs; we must distinguish between stocks and flows. Consider the following three scenarios under which stocks of arrears can accumulate. 10 The first scenario is one in which a firm pays its debts late, but it does eventually pay. In this case, inflows of arrears, i.e. new liabilities that come due and are not paid, are roughly equal to outflows, i.e.
liabilities that are overdue and are then paid, so that the stock of arrears is stable. When late payment is common, stocks of arrears can be large but we would not describe this situation as one in which firms have SBCs, since they do actually pay their debts.
The second scenario is one in which a distressed firm is unable to pay its debts. Initially, the firm's overdue debts may accumulate if the firm fails to pay its existing debts but still obtains new ones, so that inflows exceed outflows. The subsequent reaction of creditors determines whether we would classify the firm's budget constraint as soft. If the firm continues to obtain new loans and cash from creditors, and this is made possible by the fact that the firm is in distress, then the firm has a SBC. On the other hand, if creditors cease to provide new money to the firm, we would classify the firm's budget constraint as hard. Note that in this latter case the firm has a large stock of debt in arrears but the stock is stable, or at most increasing due only to the accumulation of unpaid interest and penalties. The third scenario is one in which firms act strategically by colluding in non-payment to each other, forcing a general bailout of firms by the government (Perotti, forthcoming).
To summarize, when looking for evidence of SBCs in TEs, we need to establish, first, the nature of the losses generated by firms, and in particular whether loss-makers are economically or financially distressed, or neither; and second, whether genuinely distressed firms are actually receiving net financing, either as cash subsidies or in the form of lending and increases in debt over and above accrued interest costs.
Suppliers, trade credit and 'inter-enterprise arrears'
It has sometimes been argued that stocks of trade credit, and of overdue trade credit-socalled 'inter-enterprise arrears'-are very large in TEs, and that this is evidence of SBCs and financial indiscipline. 11 We suggest here that, in fact, the empirical evidence on trade credit in TEs generally supports the opposite conclusion: suppliers in TEs usually apply hard budget constraints towards their customers. The most straightforward way to make this point is with three empirical observations. First, total trade credit in TEs is, in fact, no larger than total trade credit in developed Western economies. Second, overdue trade credit in TEs is, in fact, no larger than overdue trade credit in developed Western economies. Third, the level of overdue trade credit in most TEs has been roughly stable for most of the transition. Western economies, tolerate late payment by customers, and do so simply because they want the business. They do not tolerate non-payment, and while distressed firms in TEs do tend to accumulate overdue debts to suppliers when they get into difficulties, suppliers do not continue to supply these firms unless they are actually getting paid (for an illustration of this from Poland see Section 6 below).
This behaviour by firms emerged despite the lack of working bankruptcy laws and low numbers of actually bankruptcy filings. This brings up another measurement pitfall, namely that low numbers of bankruptcies are not evidence of SBCs. Bankruptcy and liquidation in TEs initially are weak formal procedures that are used primarily to sort out competing claims of creditors, i.e. to solve stock problems. If a customer in a TE repeatedly fails to pay a supplier, the supplier will in the first instance stop shipping to the customer. The supplier then has the option of pursuing the claim for unpaid debts in the bankruptcy courts. When the bankruptcy framework is used in this way to address the stock problem, however, the flow problem has already been solved because the supplier has stopped shipping to the delinquent customer. Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) , Croitoru (1997) , CIS-Goskomstat, and author's estimates and updates.
The relatively low numbers of bankruptcies in TEs are less a symptom of financial indiscipline or SBCs than of other factors, e.g. the lack of a decent legal framework or perhaps a poorly functioning system of commercial law in general, the lack of experience with bankruptcy laws, the lack of experienced judges and lawyers, and the low liquidation value of many debtors relative to the value of the claims against them. The main point for the purposes of this paper is that formal bankruptcy or liquidation is not needed for suppliers to impose hard budget constraints and financial discipline on customers.
Hungary is the one example of a TE in which we have observed large numbers of bankruptcies, and, as such, provides an example of these measurement pitfalls. In 1990-91, Hungarian policy-makers and analysts observed an increase in the volume of late payments in the economy. From this evidence they concluded that there was a serious financial discipline problem in the enterprise sector. To deal with this perceived problem, the 1992 bankruptcy law included a clause, the famous 'automatic trigger', that required a firm with an overdue payable, of any size, owed to anybody, which was 90 days or more overdue, to file for reorganization. A deluge of bankruptcy filings followed. 13 In fact, as 15 In all cases, overdue trade credit reappeared after the bailout, which is not surprising given that overdue trade credit is generally found in Western and transition economies alike. These episodes of strategic arrears can be seen as examples of the SBC resulting from paternalism, with the twist that it is most or all of the enterprise sector that needs and obtains a bailout. Similarly, governments sometimes pressure electricity suppliers to continue to supply distressed but politically-important firms. These firms have SBCs and the subsidy is delivered via the continued extension of trade credit by the electricity suppliers, but again it is paternalism on the part of the government which results in SBCs.
Banks and bad debts
The bank-enterprise relationship in TEs is complex, with a considerable degree of variation among countries. The empirical evidence available to date suggests that, in the slower reformers, the banking system is a key route by which budget constraints are softened. In particular, so-called directed state credits are one of the main mechanisms used by governments to subsidize loss-makers. These credits are made at low nominal and usually negative real interest rates and are often eventually rolled over or forgiven. A good example is conversion loans for military-industrial complex enterprises in Russia. Supposedly for conversion to civilian production, these loans were apparently often used simply to cover wages and other operating costs. Directed credits are also a symptom of financial indiscipline in general, since they often go to politically powerful firms that are actually financially healthy. In the first few years of the Russian transition, a major focus of managerial lobbying was to get on the appropriate directed state credit list. In the rapidly reforming TEs, however, directed state credits are typically fairly small. We can differentiate between two meanings of the term 'bad debt'. First, it can refer to loans which have a low economic or net present value to the bank. Second, it can refer to loans which have been classified as bad, typically by the bank, i.e. loans which banks have reported as being overdue, dubious or non-performing. For our purposes it is the first definition which is the more relevant. We would expect that distressed firms would find it difficult to service or repay their existing bank loans in the absence of external assistance and hence the economic value to the bank of these loans would be low; we want to know whether banks are extending fresh financing to such firms despite this.
The available data on bad debt in TEs typically uses the second definition of bad debt as classified loans. Unfortunately, we often cannot readily establish the existence of SBCs using this definition. Banks may be reluctant to report that they have large volumes of assets that are bad in the economic sense of low net present value, and may, for example, hide the existence of such loans by rolling them over as they come due, thus maintaining on their balance sheets an accounting value for these loans well in excess of their true economic value; such behaviour by banks has been observed in market as well as in transition economies.
Conversely, if classified loans are increasing, it means that banks are reporting an increase in the amount of loans they recognise as bad, but it does not imply that they are actually making new bad loans at the time. Increases in classified loans observed in TEs may sometimes simply be accounting flows resulting from recognition by the banks of pre-existing stock problems-bad loans (in the economic sense) made earlier in the transition or even inherited from the socialist period.
To assess whether banks in TEs provide firms with SBCs, we need to look for evidence that distressed firms are receiving net bank financing. Because interest charges are a major component of the financial flows between banks and firms, looking just at the growth in the stock of bank debt of distressed firms may be misleading. If a distressed firm is not servicing its bank debt, and the bank is charging positive real interest rates on the outstanding debt, the amount owed by the firm to the bank will continue to grow in real terms even if the bank is not soft and is not making new loans to the firm. Bank financing net of interest charges, i.e.
the change in nominal bank debt less interest due, is a more useful measure because it provides an absolute benchmark. If the bank is providing a distressed firm with a SBC then net bank financing will be positive; cash is flowing from the bank to the firm. Conversely, negative net bank financing of loss-makers suggests the banks are imposing hard rather than soft budget constraints.
Evidence on net bank financing of loss-makers in Hungary, a rapidly reforming TE, illustrates how the classified loans of banks can grow rapidly at the same time that the banks are imposing hard budget constraints on firms. In 1992, the volume of classified loans in the Hungarian banking sector grew tremendously-by a factor of 2 to 4 times in real terms, or the equivalent of about 5% of GDP. Some observers concluded that the Hungarian banking sector was very soft and that firms had SBCs. Bonin and Schaffer (1995) show, however, that net bank financing of these highly unprofitable firms was actually negative. The cash flow between banks and these loss-makers was not from the banks to the firms but rather from the firms to the banks. This is demonstrated by the scatterplots in Figures 1 and 2 , which present the relationship between firm profitability and net bank financing received by the firm. The database used covers all medium and large non-financial firms in Hungary in 1992, but only larger firms with bank debts greater than US $1 million are plotted; majority foreign-owned firms are also excluded. 16 The size of each point indicates the size of the firm's average bank debt in 1992. We note in passing that the net flow of cash for profitable firms also for the most part went in the direction from firms to the banks. This is probably due in large part to the very high interest rates (both nominal and real) in both countries in the years discussed. High real interest rates imply, ceteris paribus, a large transfer from firms to banks. They also decrease the attractiveness to profitable firms of borrowing from banks compared to the alternative of self-financing out of retained profits; the negative net bank financing for profitable firms may reflect the unwillingness of profitable firms to borrow at these interest rates rather than the banks' unwillingness to lend.
In short, Hungarian banks tried to reduce their exposure to their distressed clients starting quite early in the transition, and at the same time that they were declaring large portions of their portfolios to be non-performing. They do not appear to have presented their unprofitable clients with SBCs on a large scale. 17 More generally, large, or increasing, stocks of debt classified as non-performing by the banks are in and of themselves neither necessary nor sufficient evidence of SBCs. More evidence, e.g. on net bank financing of loss-makers, is needed if we want to assess whether the banking sector in a TE is softening the budget constraints of firms.
6. Government subsidies and tax arrears 18 We argued above that we cannot readily separate budgetary subsidies deriving from price controls from subsidies which represent financial support to inefficient and otherwise lossmaking firms or industries. Nevertheless, the available evidence does suggest that in the rapidly reforming TEs, budgetary subsides are not a mechanism through which SBCs are introduced on a scale much larger than in developed market economies. Most remaining budgetary subsidies in the rapidly reforming TEs are now concentrated in a small number of sectors that are typically subject to low fixed prices. Examples of sectors receiving subsidies are public transportation, especially railway transportation, the energy sector, especially coal, housing subsidies, and agriculture. The volume of budgetary subsidies in the rapidly reforming TEs (about 3% of GDP), the range of price controls and regulations, and indeed often the political or economic rationales for the existence of these subsidies, are comparable to those observed in Western Europe. Inexpensive rail transport and subsidies to farmers, for example, are standard outcomes of public policy in most European countries, East and West.
Budgetary subsidies in the slower reformers, on the other hand, are usually larger than in the rapidly reforming TEs, and more often relate to SBCs or to other forms of financial indiscipline and weak government.
The main route by which budget constraints are softened in the rapidly reforming TEs, and one of the main routes by which they are softened in the slower reformers, is via tax arrears.
Tax arrears are taxes that have been accrued and have come due but have not been paid.
Personal income tax is still small in TEs, and virtually all tax arrears are arrears of firms. Tax arrears should be distinguished from taxes evaded. The key concern with tax evasion is detection whereas, with tax arrears, it is collection.
The existence of a stock of tax arrears is not in itself necessarily a cause for alarm; we would expect to observe a stable stock of tax arrears that reflects, for example, legitimate late payment of taxes by firms which are disputing their tax bills. We should be concerned, however, if there is a flow of tax liabilities that is not getting paid at all or is being written off,
i.e. if tax arrears are a kind of financial transfer to continuing firms. This is indeed the case in TEs; stocks of tax arrears are large and growing.
We estimate the aggregate stock of tax arrears in TEs to range from a couple of percent to over 10% of GDP, and the real flow of tax arrears to be on the order of 1-3% of GDP per annum, or about the same scale as budgetary subsidies (Table 2) . Stocks of tax arrears also exist in Western countries, but they tend to be stable and reflect either late payment or uncollectable tax liabilities that are written off when bankrupt firms are wound up. The flow of taxes written off as uncollectable in Western countries is also a kind of financial transfer to firms, but it is both much smaller than the flow of tax arrears in TEs, amounting to a fraction of a per cent of GDP per annum, and unlike tax arrears in TEs, it is not a transfer to continuing firms. To take a concrete example, the stock of tax arrears in New Zealand in the early 1990s amounted to the equivalent of 1-2% of GDP; annual write-offs of uncollectable taxes came to the equivalent of 0.3-0.4% of GDP (Schaffer, 1996) .
The tax arrears problem in TEs takes two forms: tax arrears accumulated by distressed firms, and tax arrears as a focus for lobbying by profitable firms or firms in general. The first of these cases is the case of the SBC; the second, a case of general financial indiscipline resulting from a weak state susceptible to lobbying. We consider each in turn.
In the first case, the state does not force the firm into liquidation in pursuit of its tax claim, but instead tolerates the non-payment of taxes, so that inflows of overdue taxes continue and the stock of tax arrears increases. Being liabilities of distressed firms, these tax arrears are unlikely ever to be collected. Government toleration of tax arrears means, in effect, that these distressed firms are being subsidized, or, in other words, that they have SBCs. The high degree of concentration of tax arrears in loss-making firms in TEs is evidence that these firms have their budget constraints softened in this way. World Bank surveys of manufacturing firms in Russia (1994 ), Hungary (1994 ), and Poland (1993 show that the most unprofitable 10-15% of firms accounted for, respectively, 44%, 62%, and 74% of total tax arrears (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996; Schaffer, 1995) . Schaffer (1995 Schaffer ( , 1996 and author's updates for Russia.
The Polish survey provides even more direct evidence (Table 3) . Most highly unprofitable firms in the survey also had negative EBITD and hence were economically as well as financially distressed. In the course of 1993, the debt of most large loss-makers to suppliers and banks actually fell in real terms, and net bank financing was negative, consistent with the view that suppliers and banks in Poland were imposing hard budget constraints. The main source of financing for highly unprofitable firms was, rather, tax arrears. The median real increase in outstanding tax liabilities of these big loss-makers amounted to the equivalent of a remarkable 11% of their assets, compared to less than 1% for other firms.
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A stylized explanation of what is happening is that when firms in TEs get into severe financial distress, they face a choice. If they don't pay their suppliers, their suppliers will refuse to supply more inputs, as discussed above with respect to trade credit arrears. They may sometimes cease servicing and repaying bank loans, as noted above, although this may be unattractive because doing without banking services may be costly or the bank may freeze the deposits of the firm or take other action which the firm would find costly. This leaves nonpayment of taxes as the last remaining option, 20 if the tax authority will tolerate it, and, in TEs, they appear to do so. Since these distressed firms are unlikely ever to repay their tax arrears, this is a subsidy; and since it is an ex post subsidy that is directed at distressed firms and that helps to rescue them from their difficulties, it is a very clear case of a SBC.
Why do the tax authorities tolerate the accumulation of tax arrears in distressed firms?
Empirical research is lacking but we can attempt an explanation. Since the typical distressed firm, in the more rapidly reforming TEs at least, will pay its workers and suppliers out of revenue generated from sales, the firm is generating positive value added. If the tax authority allows the firm to operate but tries to extract whatever tax revenue it can, the firm generates positive value added, possibly some current tax revenue, and future tax if the fortunes of the firm improve. If the tax authority moves to liquidate the firm, the recovery value will be low, value added will be lost, and reallocating both capital and labour will take time so that meanwhile there will be unemployment. All this is, moreover, politically rather costly. Tax arrears have the further attractive feature that the flow is automatically capped because firms cannot accumulate more tax arrears than they are supposed to pay in tax. Note that we have an alternative source of SBCs: the political costs correspond to the paternalism notion, but the other costs of moving to liquidate the firm suggest that some SBCs may actually be efficient in an economic sense. The strategy of tolerance of tax arrears is probably sustainable as long as it is contained within distressed firms. If it spreads to the tax system in general, the problem becomes more serious. This brings us to the second form of the tax arrears problem, tax arrears as a focus of lobbying by firms in general. Firms bargain with the state to have their tax arrears tolerated, written off or rescheduled. The weaker the state, the more widespread is the problem of tax arrears; hence, this is a considerably larger problem in the slower reformers than in the more rapidly reforming TEs.
A good example of firms lobbying to obtain subsidies in the form of tolerated tax arrears is the episode of the Russian '30:70 rule'. Payments of tax liabilities in Russia formally have priority over all other debts. At the beginning of 1994, in response to claimed financial difficulties of firms, and in particular to the growth of wage arrears, a programme was introduced to enable firms that were unable to pay both wages and taxes to use up to half of the daily balance of their settlement account to pay wages. The deferred taxes were free from both interest and late penalties, and the postponement of payment was, in effect, indefinite.
The policy applied at first only to four selected industrial sectors, oil extraction, gas, coal, and transportation of fuel and energy, even though the financial situation of some of these sectors was obviously better than average. Later in 1994, the scheme was expanded first to other sectors and then to all firms, but the share that could be used to pay wages was reduced to 30%.
The '30:70 rule' did reduce wage arrears but at the expense of promoting tax arrears. The rapid growth of tax arrears starting in 1994-95 was initially due mostly to the growth in '30:70 rule' deferrals. The episode shows how firms lobbying for special subsidies can take these in the form of tax arrears. The scheme was used by many firms, not only by those in serious financial troubles. It weakened tax discipline in general, sending a signal to firms that tax arrears would be tolerated or could be negotiated, even by healthy firms. Further government measures relating to tax arrears contributed to a worsening of tax discipline, both directly, by allowing firms to run tax arrears, and indirectly, by signaling that non-payment of taxes could be tolerated. The problem culminated in 1996 in a tax revenue crisis of serious proportions. The real flow of tax arrears in Russia in 1996 was on the order of 7% of GDP, which is very large not just in absolute terms but also in comparison to the flows of tax arrears seen in other transition countries (Table 2) .
Conclusion
The question posed in the title of this paper is, 'Do firms in transition countries have soft budget constraints?' Using Kornai's definition of the SBC as ex post bailouts of loss-making firms, we have considered selective empirical evidence from various TEs. The evidence is far from complete and interpreting it is full of pitfalls, but the short answer seems to be that lossmaking firms in TEs are sometimes able to extract subsidies and get rescued. Although this is not a novel conclusion, the means by which firms get rescued is perhaps surprising.
Budgetary subsidies appear to be of limited importance, at least in the more rapidly reforming TEs. Overdue trade credit, or so-called 'inter-enterprise arrears', have not typically been a source of SBCs; firms usually apply hard budget constraints to each other. The exceptions to this have been cases in which the government rather than firms has been the source of the softness, e.g. when firms have lobbied successfully for government bailouts to clear interenterprise arrears. Bank credit has been used to bail out firms but not as often as is sometimes argued on the basis of the large volumes of classified bank loans typically observed in TEs. In Hungary, for example, banks apparently imposed hard budget constraints on firms starting early in the transition, and the growth of classified bank loans in 1992-93 appears to have been more the result of the revelation of a stock problem rather than the result of on ongoing flow problem. Tax arrears, a phenomenon largely unanticipated at the start of transition, appear to be a main route, and in the rapidly reforming TEs, the main route, by which the budget constraints of firms are softened.
Endnotes
1. Kornai (1993) Kornai (1980) , p.568 (emphasis in the original). 'Paternalism, and soft budget constraint as one manifestation of it, is a typical social relation between ... higher authorities and management of the firm', Kornai (1992) , p.144.
4.
The study by Khaikin (1980) of quantity planning in the Soviet Union, for example, shows how firms' targets were adjusted ex post in order to make plan fulfillment easier.
5.
Indeed, the experiences of transition countries with price liberalization suggest that Gomulka was correct-chronic shortage can be eliminated with sufficient price flexibility.
6.
Another set of caveats relates to depreciation charges. These are calculated using the purchase prices of fixed capital, much of which typically dates from the socialist period.
Firms are able to reduce their taxable profit by deducting imputed depreciation on their entire stock of fixed capital, even though the real value of their socialist-era capital may be much lower than that indicated by the purchase prices. Indexation of purchase prices for inflation, on the other hand, may be inadequate.
7.
These profits are essentially paper capital gains on inventories, and hence are sometimes referred to as 'holding gains'.
8.
A well-documented example of this (see Schaffer, 1993 ) is the profit collapse in Poland in 1991; most of the collapse was caused by the decline in inflation and the consequent fall in the scale of these paper capital gains. In fact, the decrease in the inflation bias in 1991 actually helped enterprise finances, because it reduced the profit tax base and hence lowered the tax burden on firms.
9.
It is worth noting here that because most budgetary subsidies in the socialist system were product-specific and concentrated in a relatively small proportion of firms, the existence of large budgetary subsidies under socialism, often in excess of 10% of GDP, is in itself insufficient evidence for concluding that socialist firms had SBCs.
10. See Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) for a more detailed discussion.
11. Kornai (1993) , for example, makes this argument, using Hungary as an example. For an alternative view of the Hungarian experience, see below.
12. For evidence from Poland, see Belka et al. (1995) ; from Hungary, see Bonin and Schaffer (1995) ; from Russia, see Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) .
